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Abstract
Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social wel-
fare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function pro-
files and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and 
a form of weak continuity. Roberts (Rev Econ Stud 47(2):421–439, 1980) claimed 
that the induced welfare ordering on social states has a one-way representation by a 
continuous, monotonic real-valued welfare function defined on the Euclidean space 
of interpersonal utility vectors—that is, an increase in this welfare function is suf-
ficient, but may not be necessary, for social strict preference. A counter-example 
shows that weak continuity is insufficient; a minor strengthening to pairwise conti-
nuity is proposed instead and its sufficiency demonstrated.
1  Introduction: Roberts’ Claim
Consider a society with a non-empty finite set N of individuals i.1 Let X be a domain 
of at least three social states, and R(X) the set of all logically possible (complete and 
transitive) social weak preference orderings R on X. For each R ∈ R(X) , let P and I 
denote the corresponding strict preference and indifference relations.
Let ℝN denote the Euclidean space that consists of the Cartesian prod-
uct of #N copies of the real line ℝ . A utility function profile N is a mapping 
X ∋ x ↦ N(x) ∈ ℝN . Let UN denote the set of all utility function profiles on X. 
Following Sen (1970; 1977), a social welfare functional (or SWFL) f on a domain 
D ⊆ U
N is a mapping D ∋ N ↦ f (N) ∈ R(X) that determines a (complete and 
transitive) social preference ordering R = f (N) for each utility function profile in 
D  . With some slight abuse of notation, we let R(N) , P(N) and I(N) denote respec-
tively the weak preference, strict preference, and indifference relations associated 
with f (N).
 * Peter J. Hammond 
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Given any non-empty subset A ⊂ X , say that: 
1. two utility function profiles N , ̃N ∈ UN are equal on A just in case one has 
N(x) = ̃N(x) for all x ∈ A;
2. two social preference orderings R and R̃ on X are equal on A just in case, for all 
y, z ∈ A , one has y R z ⟺ y R̃ z.
The main part of this paper considers social welfare functionals f which satisfy at 
least the first two of the following three axioms: 
Unrestricted domain (U)  : The domain D  of f is the whole of UN.
Independence (I)  : Given any non-empty subset A ⊂ X , if the two utility 
function profiles N , ̃N ∈ D  are equal on A, then the two 
associated social orderings f (N), f (̃N) ∈ R(X) are also 
equal on A.
Pareto indifference (P0)  : In case y, z ∈ X and N ∈ D  satisfy N(y) = N(z) , the 
associated social indifference relation satisfies y I(N) z.
An important result in social choice theory with interpersonal comparisons is the 
“strong neutrality” or “welfarism” result due to D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) and 
Sen (1977, p. 1553). This states that, when f satisfies all three conditions (U), (I), 
and (P0 ), then there exists a (complete and transitive) social welfare ordering R∗ on 
ℝ
N with the property that y R z ⟺ N(y) R∗ N(z) . This plays a prominent role 
among the results appearing in the surveys by Sen (1984), Blackorby et al. (1984), 
D’Aspremont (1985), Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998), and Bossert and Weymark 
(2004). Both Sen (1977) and d’Aspremont (D’Aspremont (1985),  p.  34) provide 
complete proofs.2
While the Pareto indifference axiom (P0 ) is appealing, the impossibility theorem 
in Arrow (1963) is the most prominent of many results that replace it with the fol-
lowing alternative: 
Pareto (P)  : In case the two social states y, z ∈ X and the utility function profile 
N ∈ D  satisfy N(y) ≫ N(z) , the associated strict preference relation 
P(N) on X satisfies y P(N) z.3
 Specifically, under the assumption that individuals’ utility functions are ordinally 
non-comparable, Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that (U), (I) and (P) together 
imply a dictatorship. To develop a theory general enough to cover this important 
2 Unfortunately, d’Aspremont’s proof, which is otherwise the more elegant of the two, includes a crucial 
typographical error. The option e should be chosen so that b ≠ e ≠ d.
3 Given any pair , ∈ ℝN with  = (ai)i∈N and  = (bi)i∈N , we use the following notation for vector 
orderings: (i)  ≧  in case ai ≥ bi for all i ∈ N ; (ii)  ≫  in case ai > bi for all i ∈ N ; (iii)  >  in case 
 ≧  but  ≠  . We also let ℝN
++
 denote the set { ∈ ℝN ∣  ≫ } of strictly positive vectors in ℝN.
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case, Roberts (1980, p. 427) specifies an additional condition that can be restated as 
follows:4
Weak continuity (WC)  : For all utility function profiles N ∈ D  and all vectors 
 ∈ ℝN with  ≫  , there exists a utility function profile 
N

∈ D  satisfying  ≫ N(x) − N

(x) ≫  for all social 
states x ∈ X with the property that f (N) = f (N

).
Then Roberts (1980, p. 428) claims the following:
Claim Suppose that the SWFL D ∋ N ↦ f (N) ∈ R(X) satisfies (U), (I), (P), 
and (WC). Then there exists a continuous function ℝN ∋  ↦ W() ∈ ℝ , strictly 
increasing with an increase in all its arguments, with the property that for all utility 
function profiles N ∈ D  and all social states y, z ∈ X one has
This claim has come to be known as Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak wel-
farism” theorem.5 In many of the surveys mentioned above, it was cited as an alter-
native to the strong neutrality result of D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) and Sen 
(1977, p. 1553). The unpublished results by Le Breton (1987) and by Bordes and Le 
Breton (1987) investigating Roberts’ theorem for restricted economic domains have 
since been amalgamated with related results that appear in Bordes et al. (2005).
Condition (WC), however, is too weak for the claim to hold. To show this, 
Section  2 provides a counter example which even satisfies the following familiar 
condition: 
Strict Pareto (P∗)  : In case the two social states y, z ∈ X and the utility function 
profile N ∈ D  satisfy N(y) ≧ N(z) , the associated social pref-
erences satisfy y R(N) z , with y P(N) z unless N(y) = N(z).
The same example shows the error in Roberts’ attempt to prove his intermediate 
Lemma 6. Then Section 3 uses a modified form of the alternative “shift invariance” 
condition due to Roberts (1983, p. 74) himself in order to prove the crucial Lemma 6 
in Roberts (1980). This establishes that a slight alteration to Claim 1 makes it valid.
W(N(y)) > W(N(z)) ⟹ y P(N) z
4 Roberts’ original condition has been restated in a way that seems more appropriate if there is a 
restricted domain D ⊂ UN of admissible utility profiles.
5 The Roberts’ theorem which is the topic of this paper concerns social choice in the sense of aggregat-
ing preferences. It differs from the Roberts’ theorem on revelation of preferences that appeared in Rob-




2  Weak Continuity: A Counter Example
2.1  Definition of a Discontinuous Social Welfare Ordering
The following is an example of a society with two individuals and a strictly increasing 
and symmetric utilitarian welfare function
such that the induced SWFL defined on X by
satisfies conditions (U), (I), (P∗ ) and (WC). Yet the function W that we will define 
has a discontinuity at the origin  = (0, 0) which implies a discontinuity in the pref-
erence ordering R on ℝ2 defined by (2). This implies that no continuous function W 
can satisfy Claim 1 in this example.
Indeed, first define the function ℝ2 ∋ (v1, v2) =  ↦ w() ∈ ℝ by
Next, partition ℝ2 into the three subdomains S1, S2, S3 and then define the symmetric 
function Si ∋  ↦ W() ∈ ℝ for i = 1, 2, 3 so that
The indifference map corresponding to this function is illustrated in Fig. 1, which 
shows how: 
 (i) the closed set S1 is separated from S3 by the common boundary line 
{ ∈ ℝ2 ∣ v1 + v2 = 0} , which constitutes the closed indifference curve 
W() = 0;
 (ii) the open set S2 is separated from S3 by the common boundary set 
{ ∈ ℝ2 ∣ w() = 0};
 (iii) (0, 0) belongs to S1 , but is a common boundary point of all three subdomains.
Consider first the intermediate subdomain S3 , which consists of two wedges where 
v1 + v2 > 0 and w() ≤ 0 . On S3 , it follows from (6) that
(1)ℝ2 ∋ (u1, u2) =  ↦ W(u1, u2) = W() → ℝ
(2)a R b ⟺ W(u1(a), u2(a)) ≥ W(u1(b), u2(b))
(3)w() ∶= min{v1 + 2v2, 2v1 + v2}
(4)W() ∶= v1 + v2 on S1 ∶= { ∈ ℝ2 ∣ v1 + v2 ≤ 0}
(5)W() ∶= 1 + w() on S2 ∶= { ∈ ℝ2 ∣ w() > 0}
(6)W() ∶= exp
(v1 + 2v2)(2v1 + v2)
3(v1 + v2)
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In S3 , because v1 + v2 > 0 , this is a differentiable function of  . Its first partial deriv-
ative is
By symmetry, its second partial derivative is also positive. This shows that 
S3 ∋  ↦ W() ∈ ℝ is strictly increasing.




) ∈ S3 which con-
verges to a point ̄ = (v̄1, v̄2) ≠ (0, 0) that lies on the lower boundary of S3 because 
v̄1 + v̄2 = 0 . Evidently it follows from (7) that, as n → ∞ , so lnW(vn1, v
n
2





) → 0 . Also, it follows from (3) and (6) that W() = 1 when 
 lies on the upper boundary of S3 , where w() = 0 . So the range set W(S3) must 



















Fig. 1  Eight level curves of the function (v1, v2) ↦ W(v1, v2)
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Putting these results for the function ℝ2 ∋  ↦ W() on the subdomain S3 , together 
with obvious properties on the subdomains S1 and S2 where W is defined by (4) and (5), 
we see that the respective range sets are the three pairwise disjoint line intervals
From this it it is evident that the function  ↦ W() is strictly increasing throughout 
ℝ
2 , and continuous except at (0, 0) , where W(0, 0) = 0.
The three-dimensional graph of W(v1, v2) has a boundary that includes the vertical 
“cliff” {(0, 0)} × [0, 1] in ℝ3 of height 1. The base of this cliff is at the origin (0, 0, 0), 
which is on the graph of W because W(0, 0) = 0 . Thus, the mapping ℝ2 ∋  ↦ W() is 
discontinuous at  = (0, 0) . Not only is the function W discontinuous; so is the prefer-
ence relation it induces. Indeed, for each fixed ?̄? ∈ S3 where W(?̄?) ∈ (0, 1] , the upper 
contour set {(v1, v2) ∈ ℝ2 ∣ W(v1, v2) ≥ W(?̄?)} is not closed because it excludes the 
point (0, 0) which is in its closure.
2.2  Verifying Weak Continuity
Consider now the SWFL U2 ∋ (u1, u2) ↦ f (u1, u2) defined as in Section  2.1. Obvi-
ously, this induced SWFL satisfies conditions (U), (I) and (P∗ ). To verify condition 
(WC) it is enough to construct, for each fixed  = (1, 2) ∈ ℝ2++ , a transformation
satisfying
together with the requirement that  ↦ W(()) and  ↦ W() are ordinally equiv-
alent welfare functions in the sense that there exists a strictly increasing transforma-
tion ℝ ∋  ↦ () ∈ ℝ for which W(()) ≡ (W()).
In the following constructions, given any fixed  = (1, 2) ∈ ℝ2++ , let
Then 𝜖∗ > 0 , of course. The transformation will take the form
for a suitably constructed scalar function ℝ2 ∋  ↦ () ∈ ℝ taking values in the 
open interval (0, ∗).
Case 1: The simplest case is when
In this case, define () ∶= 1
2
∗ for ∗ given by (8). Then (9) implies that
W(S1) = (−∞, 0], W(S2) = (1,∞), W(S3) = (0, 1]
ℝ





(0, 0) ≪ (v1, v2) − 
() ≪ 
(8)∗ ∶= min{1, 2} ∈ ℝ and  ∶= (1, 1) ∈ ℝ2
(9)ℝ2 ∋  ↦ () ∶=  − ()  ∈ ℝ2
(10)v1 + v2 ≤ 0 and so W() = v1 + v2 ≤ 0
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() = v1 + v2 − 𝜖∗ ≤ −𝜖∗ < 0 . Now, whenever 
v1 + v2 ≤ 0 , it follows that
provided we define
Case 2: This case occurs when
In this case, define
Clearly, this definition implies that () ∈ (0, ∗) . Also
But w() ∶= min{v1 + 2v2, 2v1 + v2} and (13) implies that () ≤
1
6
w() . So it fol-
lows from (14) and (15) that
So the definition of ℝ2 ∋  ↦ W() ∈ ℝ in (5) and of ℝ2 ∋  ↦ () ∈ ℝ in (13) 
imply, together with (16), that
It follows that W(()) = (W()) provided that we define
Case 3: This leaves the hardest third case, when
In this case, the definition in (6) implies that 0 < W() ≤ 1.
Fix any  = (v1, v2) ∈ ℝ2 satisfying (18). Then, given any  ∈ ℝ2 satisfying 






(11)(W) ∶= W − ∗ for all W ≤ 0







() = v1 + 2v2 − 3
()
(15)and 21() + 

2






















= 1 + w() − 3𝜆()























(W + 1)} for all W > 1
(18)w() ≤ 0 and also v1 + v2 > 0
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Now consider the function g defined on the open interval in (19) by
In Sect. 2.1 we saw that W is strictly increasing as a function of two variables, so the 
function g is strictly decreasing. Also, when 𝜆 > 0 , it is evident that
On the other hand, when 𝜆 < 1
2
(v1 + v2) , because e1 = e2 = 1 , one has
So for all  ∈ I() the inequalities (21) and (22) imply that the 2-vector  −   sat-
isfies (18). It follows that W( −  ) is also defined by (6), implying that
Now let  denote a suitably chosen positive scalar constant which is independent of 
both  and  , and whose possible range will be specified later. For each  ∈ ℝ2 that 
satisfies the inequalities (18), because g is strictly decreasing and positive, we can 
define () implicitly as the unique value of  that solves the equation
Then () will be well defined and positive, with
where (W) ∶= W exp(− ∗) ∈ (0, 1) whenever 0 < W ≤ 1.
It remains only to choose 𝜇 > 0 so that the corresponding solution to equation (24) 
exists in the open interval I() defined by (19) and so satisfies 𝜆() < 𝜖∗ . Because we 
are assuming that the inequalities (18) hold, definition (6) implies that any () satis-
fying (24) and (19) must be a value of  which solves the equation
But v1 + v2 > 2𝜆 > 0 in the relevant interval of values of  , so we can clear fractions 
to obtain the quadratic equation q() = 0 , where
Now, note that when  = 0 the first two terms on the right-hand side of (25) cancel. 








(20)I() ∋  ↦ g() ∶= W( −  ) ∈ ℝ
(21)w( − 𝜆 ) < w() ≤ 0
(22)(v1 − 𝜆e1) + (v2 − 𝜆e2) = v1 + v2 − 2𝜆 > 0
(23)g() = W( −  ) = exp
(v1 + 2v2 − 3) (2v1 + v2 − 3)
3(v1 + v2 − 2)
(24)g() = W( −  ) = W() exp(− ∗)
W(()) = W() exp(−𝜇 𝜖∗) = 𝜓
(W()) < 1
(v1 + 2v2 − 3) (2v1 + v2 − 3)
3(v1 + v2 − 2)
=




q() ∶=(v1 + v2) (v1 + 2v2 − 3) (2v1 + v2 − 3)
− (v1 + v2 − 2) (v1 + 2v2) (2v1 + v2)
+ 3 ∗ (v1 + v2) (v1 + v2 − 2)
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In addition, simple calculation shows that
Finally, some much more tedious but still routine algebraic manipulation shows that
Because v1 + v2 > 0 but w() ≤ 0 , it follows from (3) that v1 and v2 have opposite 
signs. In particular v1 ≠ v2 and v1v2 < 0 . Then (27) implies that q(
1
2
(v1 + v2)) < 0 
whereas (28) implies that for any  satisfying 9 < 6𝜇 < 10 one has q(𝜖∗) < 0 . So 








 guarantees that, by the intermediate value theorem, 
the quadratic equation q() = 0 has a unique root () in the open interval 
I() = (0,min{ ∗,
1
2
(v1 + v2) } defined by (19).6 In particular, for each  satisfying 
(18), the root () of q() = 0 that we have found lies in (0, ∗) , as required.
Finally, putting all the three different cases together gives W(()) ≡ (W()) , 
where () =  − ()  , and then
In particular,  is strictly increasing in W for each fixed  ≫ 0 .   ◻
2.3  Diagnosis
Next, to see where his proof erred, we introduce a definition that incorporates some 
more notation from Roberts (1980, pp. 425–426).
Definition 1 Given the SWFL f, the strict preference relation ≻ on utility vectors in 
ℝ
N is defined so that  ≻  just in case there exist a utility function profile N ∈ D  
and two social states x, y ∈ X with x f (N) y such that  ≫ (x) and (y) ≫  . Then, 
for each ∗ ∈ ℝN , the three sets L(∗) , M(∗) and N(∗) are defined respectively by










(v1 + v2) (v1 − v2)
2







(𝜖1 + 𝜖2) < 0 if W ≤ 0;







(W + 1) } > 1 if W > 1.
(29)L(∗) ∶= { ∈ ℝN ∣ ∗ ≻ }
(30)M(∗) ∶= { ∈ ℝN ∣  ≻ ∗}
(31)N(∗) ∶= ℝN⧵[L(∗) ∪M(∗)]
6 Because q() → +∞ as  → +∞ , the quadratic equation q() = 0 has a second real root that satisfies 
𝜆 > max{ 𝜖∗,
1
2
(v1 + v2) } . But this root is irrelevant.
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Now, in the above example the set N() is equal to the middle region where 
W() ∈ (0, 1] . Note too that, although  ∈ N() whenever W() ∈ (0, 1] , one 
will have  −  ≻ −� whenever , ′ ≫  with  small enough so that W() ≥ 0 
because 1 + 2 ≤ v1 + v2 . This contradicts Roberts’ claim, in the course of try-
ing to prove Lemma  6, that: “...as  +  ∈ N(∗) , [condition] (WC) ensures that 
 +  − 3 ∈ N(
∗ − 4) for some  ≫ 3, 4 ≫  where  is subject to choice.”
3  A new sufficient condition
3.1  Statement of pairwise continuity
Roberts (1983,  p. 74) later introduced a shift invariance condition which can be 
slightly restated as follows: 
Condition (SI)  : Given any  ∈ ℝN
++
 , for all profiles N ∈ D  , there exists an 
� ∈ ℝN
++
 and a profile ̃N ∈ D  such that f (N) = f (̃N) and, for all 
x ∈ X , one has  ≫ N(x) − ̃N(x) ≫ �.
As he states in a footnote: “Shift invariance is slightly stronger than ...(WC). 
...The strengthening allows one to deal with problems that are akin to the existence 
of poles in a consumer’s indifference map ....”7 However, when proving his Lemma 
A.5, it seems that Roberts (1983, p. 90) in the end reverses the order of the quanti-
fied statements “for all profiles N ∈ UN ” and “there exists an � ∈ ℝN
++
 ” and actu-
ally uses the following uniform shift invariance assumption: 
Condition (USI)  : Given any  ∈ ℝN
++
 , there exists an � ∈ ℝN
++
 for which, for 
all profiles N ∈ D  , there exists a profile ̃N ∈ D  such that 
f (N) = f (̃N) and, for all x ∈ X , one has  ≫ N(x) − ̃N(x) ≫ �
.
Instead of (WC) or (SI), I shall use the following pairwise continuity assumption 
which weakens (USI): 
Condition (PC)  : Given any  ∈ ℝN
++
 , there exists an � ∈ ℝN
++
 for which, for all 
profiles N ∈ D  , given any pair x, y ∈ X satisfying x P(N) y , 
there exists a profile ̃N ∈ D  with ̃N(x) ≪ N(x) − � and 
̃N(y) ≫ N(y) −  such that x P(̃N) y.
Like shift invariance, condition (PC) strengthens weak continuity because the 
same strictly positive vector ′ must work simultaneously for all x, y ∈ X . Like 
uniform shift invariance, it also strengthens shift invariance because the same 
strictly positive vector ′ must also work for all profiles N ∈ D  . On the other 
7 Indeed, it is this footnote that suggested to me how the above counter example might be constructed.
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hand, condition (PC) weakens even condition (WC), as well as condition (USI), to 
the extent that the profile ̃N can depend on the pair x, y ∈ X , and also because it 
requires only one-way strict inequalities which, moreover, are different for x and y.
3.2  Sufficiency of pairwise continuity
With condition (PC) replacing (WC), Lemma 6 of Roberts (1980) will be proved via 
the following two separate lemmas that involve definitions (30) and (31):
Lemma 1 If f satisfies (U), (I) and (P), then for all , �, , � ∈ ℝN with , ′ ≫  , 
one has  ∈ N(�) ⟹  +  ∈ M(� − �).8
Proof Suppose that x, y, z are three distinct elements of X. By condition (U), there 
exists a profile N ∈ D  such that
By Definition 1, if z P(N) y were true, it would imply that ′ ≻  . So 
 ∈ N(�) ⟹ y R(N) z . Then the Pareto condition (P) implies that x P(N) y , and 
so  ∈ N(�) ⟹ x P(N) z because R(N) is transitive. From (32) it follows that 
 ∈ N(�) ⟹  +  ≻ � − �.
Part (b) of the following Lemma is a minor restatement of the conclusion of 
Lemma 6 in Roberts (1980):
Lemma 2 If f satisfies (U), (I), (P) and (PC), then: 
(a) if , , ′ in ℝN satisfy  ≫  as well as  +  ∈ M(� + ) for all  ≫  , then 
 ∈ M(�);
(b) for all , ∗ in ℝN  that satisfy  ∈ N(∗) , there is no  ∈ ℝN
++
 such that 
 +  ∈ N(∗).
Proof (a) Given  ≫  , let ′ ≫  be specified as in the statement of condition (PC). 
Choose  ≫  so that  ≪ ′ . Because  +  ∈ M(� + ) , condition (U) and Defini-
tion 1 imply that there exist N ∈ D  and x, y ∈ X such that x P(N) y while
By condition (PC), there exists ̃N ∈ D  such that x P(̃N) y while
(32) +  ≫ N(x) ≫ N(y) ≫  and � ≫ N(z) ≫ � − �
(33) +  ≫ N(x) and N(y) ≫ � + 
(34)̃N(x) ≪ N(x) − � and ̃N(y) ≫ N(y) − 
8 This is the correct “preliminary result” in Roberts’ discussion of Lemma 6. However, it seemed that 
the proof provided there could benefit from more detail.
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But then (33) and (34) together imply that ̃N(x) ≪  +  − � ≪  , because of the 
choice of  ; they also imply that ̃N(y) ≫ � . Because x P(̃N) y , it follows from 
Definition 1 that  ≻ ′.
(b) Suppose that  +  ∈ N(∗) . Definition (31)  implies that ∗ ∈ N( + ) . 
Choose any ′ ≫  satisfying ′ ≪  . Now Lemma  1 implies that 
∗ +  ∈ M( + �) for all  ≫  . So part (a) implies that ∗ ∈ M() . In particular, 
 ∉ N(∗).
3.3  Invariance conditions and pairwise continuity9
Just as with Roberts’ (WC) and (SI) conditions, condition (USI) and so (PC) is 
certainly satisfied if f is invariant under a set of transformations of individual util-
ity functions large enough to include all shifts of the form ũi(x) ≡ 𝛼 + ui(x) (for 
all i ∈ N and x ∈ X ) with  ∈ ℝ independent of i. Of the six invariance classes Φ 
presented on p. 423 of Roberts (1980), this is true of the first five, namely (ONC), 
(CNC), (OLC), (CUC), and (CFC).
It remains to discuss the sixth cardinal ratio-scale or (CRS) class, as well as the 
broader non-comparable ratio-scale or (NRS) invariance class that includes all trans-
formations of the form ũi(x) ≡ 𝛽i ui(x) (for all i ∈ N and x ∈ X ) with 𝛽i > 0 for each 
individual i ∈ N . Indeed, since the unrestricted domain condition (U) allows each 
utility function to have both positive and negative values, there are difficulties with 
the key condition (PC) in this case.10
When Roberts (1980, p. 423) discusses the (CRS) class, he states that “For sim-
plicity, it will be assumed that welfares are always strictly positive.” This, of course, 
violates condition (U), but almost all the relevant results are easily restated for any 
restricted domain D ⊂ UN large enough to include all profiles of utility functions 
whose values are strictly positive. Nevertheless, the key pairwise continuity condi-
tion (PC) is violated because, no matter how small � ∈ ℝN
++
 may be, for any x ∈ X 
there will always be a strictly positive-valued profile N ∈ D  such that N(x) ≪ � ; 
this makes it impossible to find any profile ̃N of strictly positive-valued utility func-
tions that satisfies ̃N(x) ≪ N(x) − �.
When utilities are restricted to have strictly positive values throughout X, how-
ever, one can work instead with ln ui(x) as a transformed utility function. Then ratio-
scale invariance for utilities is equivalent to invariance under additive shifts of their 
logarithms. Moreover, condition (PC) can be restated for these transformed utility 
functions. A similar trick works when utility functions are restricted to have strictly 
negative values; one works instead with − ln[−ui(x)] as a transformed utility func-
tion. The (CRS) and (NRS) invariance classes present problems only when utilities 
are allowed to change signs, or to become zero.
10 There are also difficulties with Lemma 8 of Roberts (1980). We note that Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1982) as well as Tsui and Weymark (1997), in their work on ratio-scale invariant social welfare func-
tionals, imposed a more direct continuity condition on a social preference ordering which is defined on 
the space of utility vectors.
9 This subsection in particular owes much to John Weymark and the anonymous referee.
1 3
Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction 
4  Conclusion
The weak neutrality or welfarism theorem due to Roberts (1980) is indeed “both 
important and useful” (p. 428). The minor errors in its statement and in the proof 
of the key Lemma 6 are not very difficult to correct by replacing the weak continu-
ity condition (WC) with the new pairwise continuity condition (PC) stated here in 
Section 3.1.
An open question is whether the closely related Theorem  1 of Roberts (1983) 
holds under shift invariance (SI) instead of uniform shift invariance (USI), which 
is stronger than (PC). However, even (USI) is weak enough that having to impose it 
instead of (WC) or (SI) would do little to detract from the significance or wide appli-
cability of Roberts’ theorem.
Only in the case of ratio-scale measurability of utilities that can change sign does 
Roberts’ theorem seem inapplicable. With zero as the utility of the infinite set of 
potential people who, in each possible social state, never come into existence, this 
happens to be exactly the setting that we consider in Chichilnisky et al. (2020). But 
in that paper we extend the kind of original position due to Vickrey (1945) and Har-
sanyi (1953; 1955). Then we use an “impartial benefactor” argument to derive a 
utilitarian SWFL more directly.
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